WHEN revolutionaries stormed the American embassy in the Iranian capital on November 4th 1979 they took more than five dozen hostages and held most of them for a painful 444 days. The episode is known to many Iranians as “The Conquest of the American spy den”. Bad feeling continues to this day, long after the hostages have become fodder for history books and Hollywood films. Few modern nations inspire so much mutual distrust and loathing.
The inauguration of a new Iranian president on August 4th is a rare chance to change that. Hassan Rohani is not a reformer or friend of the West—no such man could rise to the top in Iran’s system of managed democracy. But unlike his predecessor, a straightforward wolf in wolf’s clothing when it came to foreign relations, Mr Rohani comes with fewer lupine features. Even if many outsiders (notably the Israelis) sense something sinister underneath, he has sold himself to the Iranian people as a pragmatist and a negotiator. Though the deal later fell apart, as the head of the national security council in 2003 he agreed to a pause in Iran’s nuclear programme, the main bone of contention between the two countries. He has already generated some optimism at home, both by hinting at relaxing some political restrictions (see
article) and by suggesting direct talks with America, with whom Iran has no diplomatic links. This has encouraged speculation that a new deal on the nuclear programme is available.
For many reasons, America and its allies should be cautious. Mr Rohani’s offer of talks may be a delaying tactic, giving the centrifuges more time: in the past he has boasted of outwitting the West. Even if genuine, he represents only one of many power centres in the Islamic republic: the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, still controls the nuclear programme. The deal on offer may fall short of ending Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which threaten the region’s stability.
Barack Obama, who offered out a symbolic hand of peace towards Iran early in his first term only to be rejected, is right to treat Mr Rohani warily. But he should also seize this opportunity to talk. That is partly because not doing so offers little advantage. In the short term it would present Iran with an easy propaganda victory—the Great Satan does not want peace—while making it more likely that Iran speeds up the centrifuges. In the long term that paves the way either for Iran to get the bomb (a disaster), or for military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities (quite possibly another disaster, though of a different sort) or some hellish combination of those two outcomes.
Hassan, this is Barack
Mr Obama, who is desperate to avoid military confrontation, has something to gain from talking. If at least parts of Mr Rohani’s pitch are genuine, there may be a deal to be had. Western sanctions have been causing great economic hardship in Iran. Mr Rohani, a leader with unusually wide domestic appeal, can probably carry his country with him if he wants to do a deal. By contrast, if as the Israelis suspect, he is bluffing, then he will be exposed. If Iran gains a few more months of sneaky reprocessing, that will be a loss, but not a big one.
Better relations can only be useful. America and Iran have less contact than the superpowers did in the cold war. That makes a bad relationship worse, because hardliners on both sides play on mutual distrust. Lacking any kind of regular contact between bureaucracies or institutional structures, fear trumps all else.
It is too soon to start opening embassies. But the two countries should start talking, and the world will discover whether Mr Rohani is wolf, sheep or statesman.